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Live Meanings
Paul Dekker*
A notion of ‘Live Meanings’ serves to relativize the ambitions of formal semantics
and to strictly maintain a principle of compositionality; this enables one to enjoy,
not deny, ndings of the contextualists—as well as those of cognitive or conceptual
semanticists. The paper can be taken to argue for a cohabitation of the distinguished
disciplines.
1 Introduction
An age old incompatibility is felt between those who advocate the philosophical
analysis of language versus those who plead for a logical one, and between those
who favour or practice cognitive versus those who adopt model-theoretic theories
of meaning. The controversies appear in various guises, in the philosophy of
language, in linguistics, and in the cognitive sciences, and show up in debates
under the headings of contextualism and compositionality, and in debates on the
benets and mists of cognitive or conceptual, and truth-conditional semantics.
It seems to me that the antagonies can be traced back to an unrealistic precon-
ception of meaning, and, paired to it, a misapprehension of the results obtained
in the area of formal semantics. The preconception and misapprehension are
shared by opponents as well as proponents of formal semantics. The basic, and
I think mistaken, or wrongly appreciated, idea is that there are such things as
meanings, and that semantics consists in the intellectual endeavour of nding out
what they are and studying them. In his overview of “Theories of Meaning” in the
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Je Speaks recently formulated the task of
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the philosopher of language interested in semantics as follows: “her job is [to] say
what dierent sorts of meanings expressions of a given language have, and which
expressions have which meanings” (Speaks 2010/4). Martin Stokhof speaks of an
‘Availability Assumption’, “which holds that meanings are available independently
of their being expressed, in a natural language or in a formal language. Only
on that assumption does it make sense to (. . . ) use one expression as a formal
representation of the meaning of another. And especially the latter is the daily
work of the formal semanticist” (Stokhof 2013, p. 210). Actually, I don’t think these
are proper qualications of the ndings of formal semanticists, even if these are
endorsed by those themselves.
I believe it does not make any real sense to talk, out of the blue, of “the meaning of
an expression”, or believe in the existence of such things, without any very specic
context or theory appended—almost obligatorily a context or theory that denes
the term ‘meaning’. (More radically, perhaps, I also do not believe in the existence
of categories of expressions, of sentences, or names, without such qualication, but
this matter goes beyond the purposes of the present paper.) Yet, like I said, such a
conception of meaning is endorsed by proponents as well as opponents of the
formal semantic enterprise. François Recanati speaks of “context-independent
meanings of our words” which can be “contextualized” and “modulated” (Recanati
2004, p. 131); Jerry Fodor starts an argument against formal semantics by “taking
for granted that either sentences mean what they do because they express the
thoughts that they do, or vice versa (whatever, exactly, vice versa comes to here.)”
(Fodor 2001, p. 2); William Croft presents the “pairing of a complex grammatical
structure with its meaning” as a basic form and the fundamental principle behind
construction grammar (Croft 2010, p. 463).
Without the intention to oppose or ridicule, colloquial or academic, discourse
about meanings, these discourses can be taken to involve profoundly contextual and
abstract theoretical uses of the term ‘meaning’. But what are meanings, if they do
not exist? Figuratively speaking I would like to put it thus. One can, at any moment,
make any arbitrary distinction —cut the pie this way or another— and then we have
what is on the one side of the distinction, and what is on the other. The two then are
possible meanings, without any assumed characteristics other than that of being
distinct from one another. In practice, but also in theory, we continuously make,
and mask, such kinds of distinctions, and the very practice of doing so is embedded
in a publicly conceptualized environment, partly governed by conventional and
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intentional principles. Aligning with (Quine 1948) and (Wittgenstein 1953), we may
recognize human verbal, or linguistic, behavior as meaningful, without thereby
postulating a realm of meanings, by conceiving of it as embedded in such practices.
Typically, verbal, or linguistic, practices have all kinds of structural characteris-
tics which semanticists (and linguists, psychologists and philosophers in general)
may want to lay bare, even though unavoidably abstractly and sketchily. If need be,
we can distinguish various dimensions of meaningfulness, e.g., a realistic or repre-
sentational one, a cognitive or conceptual one, or a social and practical one. Various,
theoretically possible, notions of meaning may emerge once one focuses on one of
these dimensions of meaning, and xes or ignores others. Certain types of expres-
sions, or items recognized as of certain types of expressions, then can be taken to
stand for certain categories of beings, thus rendering beings so-characterized as the
possible meanings of expressions so-typed; or certain conventional or functional
categories of linguistic items, or items thus identied, can be associated with types
of cognitive or social acts. Whatever the typologies are, they may each induce their
own ontology, and help to uncover or state relatively systematic distinctions and
generalizations that appear signicant along that dimension of meaning. Notice,
however, that nowhere in the statement or observation of such general charac-
terizations need it be assumed that purported ‘meanings’ are, or are like, ‘real’
meanings. A good reason being that, I think, it is highly inappropriate to speak of
‘real meanings’ in the rst place. One may best think of these ‘meanings’, so-called,
as mere artefacts of theories that help one lay bare structural meaningful aspects of
the use of natural language.
In the next section I will discuss how this reserved attitude towards meaning
bears on contextualist insights, and more in particular on the conclusions that can
be drawn from them. These insights will be taken to motivate an arguably intuitive
understanding of the principle of compositionality—a principle one can take to
be Iphigenia’s heart and the Achilles’ heel of formal semantics. This moderate, here
called ‘live’, understanding of the principle initiates a fresh look at a series of cases
which seem to escape a rigid understanding of the principle. These cases can or have
been taken to support contextualist arguments against compositionality. As we
will see, however, they, instead, can be taken to favour the principle upon its proper,
live, understanding; consequently, they can be seen to speak in favour of formal
semantics more in general. The picture that results from these considerations
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nally provides an outlook on the semantic landscape as cohabitated by various,
preferably collaborative, disciplines.
2 Contextualism and Compositionality
The formal study of meaning in natural language is seriously devoted to the
Fregean principle of compositionality. This principle can be found at work in
Frege’s writings (e.g., Frege 1892), and although it is not stated as such by Gottlob
Frege himself, it can be formulated as follows. “The meaning of an expression is a
function of the meanings of its parts and their mode of composition.” (The Principle
of Compositionality, PoC.) The intuitive idea should be familiar. If an expression is
syntactically built up in a certain way from meaningful constituent expressions,
then the meaning of the whole can be taken to depend on, be dened by, the
meanings of these constituent expressions. (And, it needs to be added, by the
interpretation of the specic way in which these constituent expressions have been
combined into the whole.) This principle, in this or one other formulation, shows
up in the vast body of 20th century work on logic, language and computation. (For
a solid, general overview, see Janssen 1997, Partee 2004.) The principle allows
for a formal explanation of the fact that nite language users may be able to create,
use and understand a possibly innite number of expressions so as to express
a possibly innite number of meanings.
The principle can be conceived of, with reason, the heart and heel of formal
semantics. The heart, because it portrays interpretation as a most rudimentary and
principled formal mapping between two recursive structures, as a homomorphism
of a given syntactic algebra to an algebra of meanings, independently specied
(Montague 1974, Janssen 1986). The heel, precisely because it has to assume this
algebra of meanings, and, because, given its rigid formal specication, it does
not seem to allow for modulations in this mapping. An old but fairly common
conception of a so-called ‘minimalist’ formal semantics does allow for pragmatic
modications of semantic meanings, but only after these are compositionally
assigned to analyzed syntactic structures (Borg 2004, Cappelen & Lepore 2005).
As I said at the start of this paper, I do not believe in a realm of independently
existing meanings, and it is at this point that the compositionality principle can be
questioned, and revaluated, as we will see. The principle has been challenged
in the rst place, from a ‘contextualist’ angle. A natural challenge to the principle
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springs from the observation that meaning is generally determined by parameters
of interpretation, other than those provided by syntactic clues, parameters which
can probably not better be characterized than ‘contextual’. (Hence, the label ‘con-
textualism’.) In the philosophy of language it is generally observed, often following
the lead of the later Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein 1953), that the context of the use of
language plays a pervasive role in its interpretation, and this to such an extent
that it hardly deserves the eort any longer to try and systematically characterize
meanings of natural language expressions without paying due attention to these
contextual aspects.
The contextual impact on meaning and interpretation has been subsumed under
various labels. To name a few, there is pragmatic enrichment, argument saturation,
domain restriction, predicate loosening, semantic coercion, deferred reference, and
what have you. Generalizing somewhat crudely, one may bring them all under the
label of ‘modulations’ of meaning (Recanati 2004). It can be attested that the various
types of modulation indeed aect all acknowledged types of semantic phenomena,
reference, predication, quantication, and other semantic constructions alike. It
will not do to repeat all the contextualist examples that have been presented, as
they are many and they are also probably fairly well-known.
François Recanati adequately summarizes the general ndings, and Emma Borg
resumes what seems to be a common conclusion:
Contextualism holds that what is said depends on the context of utterance. The
evidence in favor of contextualism is provided by indenitely many examples in
which the same sentence, which does not seem to be ambiguous, is used in dier-
ent contexts to say dierent things (Recanati 1994, p. 164). According to these
philosophers, sentences can never express complete propositions independent of
context, however explicit speakers try to be. In other words, content is always
under-determined by the linguistic material (Recanati 2006, p. 23). Contextualism
ascribes to modulation a form of necessity which makes it ineliminable. Without
contextual modulation, no proposition could be expressed—that is the gist of con-
textualism (Recanati 2005, p. 179–80).
These days, the natural descendent of the formal approach, known as minimal-
ism, has been consigned to the margins: not everyone rejects minimalism, but
lots of people do. Minimalism is rejected in favour of contextualism: roughly,
the idea that pragmatic eects are endemic throughout truth-evaluable semantic
content (Borg 2007, p. 339).
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There are few indeed that contest the contextualist’s observations, but there are
also those who do not consider these ndings a threat for the formal semanticist.
(E.g., Herman Cappelen and Ernest Lepore, Emma Borg, Peter Pagin and Je
Pelletier, and Peter Lasersohn.) More particularly, Pagin and Pelletier 2007 and
Lasersohn 2012 have shown the contextualist observations to be consistent with a
compositional rendering of the syntax-semantics interface. The rst develop a
classical compositional architecture of interpretation which provides room for the
outcomes of pragmatic modulations within the composition of meaning. They
propose a compositional syntax/semantics architecture which allows, for any
analyzed sentence, modulation of every constituent of its construction-tree and
of the corresponding meaning-tree. Such an architecture suits the theoretical goals
very well, but also, I think, does not reach to the heart of the matter, which is
where the principle of compositionality is both valuable and vulnerable. Pagin
and Pelletier still build on a xed semantic algebra, start o from given meanings of
atomic constituent expressions, and then allow for virtually any assignment of
meanings of compound constructions on the basis of no matter what meanings of
their constituent expressions. Now I do agree that in principle any expression,
however constructed, can be assigned any meaning. (Who could possibly be in
charge of excluding any such meaning assignment?) But in a formal logical space
of postulated set-theoretical meanings, a systematic interpretation procedure which
is so open may strike one as vacuous.
Lasersohn sketches a compositional assignment of contents which also takes
contextual, ‘radical pragmatic’, eects on the interpretation of constituent expres-
sions to heart. His proposal relates to specic occasions of use, and employs, e.g.,
what certain parts of a sentence are “used to talk about” in a given context, and
allows these to enter into a compositional meaning assignment. Lasersohn himself
is deliberately pretty open about what goes under the heading of “what you are
talking about” and mentions, e.g., speaker’s reference and semantic reference, and
“perhaps other kinds of “talking about” ”. As we will see, Lasersohn’s proposal
is actually very close in spirit to the one I am about to propose, but I hope to
formulate mine in both a more radical and a more principled manner.
To the extent that it makes sense to talk about meanings in the rst place, I
think the meaning of an expression cannot but simply be whatever meaning it
has on its occasion of use. Let us label this the ‘live meaning’ of the expression
on its occasion of use. A live meaning can, indeed, be anything, but it should
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obviously be tied to such an occasion of use, and be live and determined there.
Notice that this notion does not deny, or threaten, or even empty, the principle
of compositionality, as essentially also Lasersohn observed. For, the meaning of
a compound expression, on its occasion of use, can be taken to be determined
by whatever are the meanings of its constituent expressions, on that occasion
of use. We can capture these observations by slightly reformulating the principle of
compositionality as follows.
Live Principle of Compositionality (LPoC) The live meaning of a compound
expression is a function of the live meanings of its parts and their live mode
of composition.
I claim that this formulation of the principle preserves its original intent, in keeping
with how it can be meant to apply. Let me elaborate somewhat on the present
statement of the principle, in particular on the adjective ‘live’ employed here.
First, if one chooses to read the adjective as ‘real,’ the principle as stated is just
an emphatic statement of the original principle. Thus understood, assuming real
meanings and real composition of meaning, the live principle of compositionality
states what formal semanticists and logicians have been working with for years.
Second, the live meaning of an expression when used on a certain occasion may
serve to distinguish it from the live meaning of that expression when used on
another occasion. (Obviously, this raises the question of how one can identify
the two uses as uses of one and the same expression. As indicated above, this
is a very serious question, but not one I will go into in this paper.) This, as a matter
of fact, is where the contextualist ndings t in.
If one assumes or believes that expressions are associated with meanings in-
dependent of their use —ideally, so-called ‘literal’ meanings— still one needs to
acknowledge that the very same expression can be used in a whole variety of
dierent ways, with dierent meanings associated. The point here is that upon
the LPoC it is the ‘deviant’, or better, ‘instant’, meaning of the expression on
that occasion of use, that contributes to the meaning of the whole in which that
expression occurs as a constituent. Otherwise, I take it, there would be no sense in
saying that the expression had occurred with a non-literal meaning. This seems to
be fairly obvious. If, on the other hand, one does not believe in such things as literal
meanings, then, I believe, the live meanings of expressions are the only things
that are left to talk about, if, that is, one wants to make some sense of the talk
of ‘the meanings of expressions’ at all.
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This brings me to the third point, the question, of course, what these live
meanings are? The ‘live meanings’ of expressions are here understood to be
their actual interpretations in their specic contexts of use. They are what the
interlocutors, and a suitably informed observer, can agree upon as to what the
expressions mean, in those contexts of use, and they are assumed to be public,
and determinate, in the context, in principle. (The contexts, as well, are supposed to
provide the background relative to which they are determinate.) If any of this fails, if
assumptions are not warranted, or not intended, or if possible interpretations don’t
make sense, then one might judge there is no live interpretation, or another suitable
one has to be constructed. The point is that if, or once, such interpretations remain
unquestioned, they are determinate (enough) to enter, indeed, into the compositions
of (live) meanings. Obviously, this leaves no need nor room for further contextualist
qualications, because upon the present picture the meanings we are dealing with,
and which enter the composition process, are contextually completely saturated.
In the next section I will discuss some cases in which one can imagine such
construction of meanings at work. (These are fabricated cases, but not fabricated
for the present purposes.) Contextualists, or at least some of them, have taken such
examples to motivate contextualism, cast doubt on the principle of compositionality
and, thus, disqualify a formal semantic approach to meaning. But actually, as I
will argue, quite a few, if not all, examples are understood best precisely in terms of
the principle of compositionality, upon its live understanding, and thus supply
support for compositionality, and, by implication, for formal semantics.
3 The Performance of Meaning
Upon the live understanding of the principle of compositionality, the building
blocks in the composition of live meaning on a certain occasion of use are the
live meanings of the participating constituent expressions—not any other meanings
that these constituent expressions may have on other occasions. This may look like
a trivial observation, but actually it is not, as it goes against the ways in which the
principle of compositionality has been assumed to apply in the analysis of natural
language. Our discussion of the following ve cases is meant to show that, not
only live meanings are actively ‘present’ on the relevant occasions of use, but also
that ‘past’ meanings are not. The cases, together with a few others, are discussed
somewhat more extensively in (Dekker 2014). [Whatever are ‘past meanings’ is left
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to the reader. She may think of them as ‘literal meanings’ —if she can make sense of
that term— once these have been superseded by live interpretations; or, otherwise,
as just whatever other live meaning the relevant expressions have been associated
with before their present use. Choosing the latter option would of course come
close to agreeing with the conception of interpretation advocated in this paper.]
Case 1 (The Jones’s) [The rst case arises in a reaction from Saul Kripke on an
ambiguity that Keith Donnellan seems to have propagated.]
Two people see Smith in the distance and mistake him for Jones. They have a
brief colloquy:
(1) “What is Jones doing?”
“Raking the leaves.”
“Jones,” in the common language of both, is a name of Jones; it never names Smith.
Yet, in some sense, on this occasion, clearly both participants in the dialogue have
referred to Smith, and the second participant has said something true about the
man he referred to if and only if Smith was raking the leaves (whether or not Jones
was). In the example above, Jones, the man named by the name, is the semantic
referent. Smith is the speaker’s referent, the correct answer to the question, “To
whom were you referring?” (Kripke 1979, p. 14/15)
Kripke acts in this case as a suitably informed observer, and we can imagine him
intruding into the colloquy saying:
(2) That is true, but he is not Jones.
He would, thus, indicate, that he picked up an understanding of (1) as being about
Smith, refer back to him with his own use of the pronoun ‘he’, and re-establish the
past, ‘ocial’, interpretation of ‘Jones’ by reusing the name ‘Jones’. Alternatively,
assuming that the real Jones is as a matter of fact not raking the leaves, Kripke
might have interjected with:
(3) That is false, he is not Jones.
What would be false, then, is that Jones is raking the leaves, so the statement
that gets corrected is not that Smith is raking the leaves, which is obvious, but
the statement that Jones is raking the leaves. With (3) Kripke would thus show that
he actually construes (1) as about Jones, at the same time realizing, of course, that
the interlocutors are discussing Smith. This is apparent from his use of the pronoun
‘he’ in (3), which demonstratively refers to the guy who is raking the leaves, Smith.
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Upon this understanding, Kripke might as well have pointed out, slightly wittily:
(4) That is false, he is not him.
If replying thus, ‘he’ would again have been used as a demonstrative referring to
Smith, actually present, and the pronoun ‘him’ could be conceived to be coref-
erential with the term ‘Jones’ used by the rst speaker, and according to Kripke’s
own picture of the common language. So there is an amalgam of referents here: the
person actually present, Smith, who gures as the so-called speaker’s referent,
and Jones himself, which can be supposed to be called by his name.
Interestingly, it appears to be very dicult, if not impossible, to construe (1)
as a true statement—about Smith, that is— while at the same taking ‘Jones’ to
involve Jones.
(5) ?True, but he is not him.
The conrmation indicates that Kripke construes (1) as being about Smith, which
then is his live understanding of ‘Jones’, and somehow he cannot then pick up
on this as involving the real Jones, in order to select him, Jones, as a referent for the
second pronoun ‘him’ in (5). I take it that a reply with (5) indeed sounds quite
bizarre. This is to say, I take it, that ‘Jones’ may have a semantic referent, and
a speaker’s referent, which can be distinct, but when the two are dierent, only one
meaning can be live.
Case 2 (The Ham Sandwiches) [This is also a famous case, brought to us by
Georey Nunberg.]
For example, a restaurant waiter going o duty might remind his replacement:
(6) The ham sandwich is sitting at table 20.
(Nunberg 1979, p. 149)
It is clear to most of us that the restaurant waiter, by uttering (6), refers to a person,
not a ham sandwich, so that in our terms the live meaning of ‘the ham sandwich’
is someone who, e.g., orders, or has been served, a ham sandwich; it is not the
ham sandwich. Thus, later in the scenario, one can imagine the waiter, still there, to
follow up with, for instance, (7):
(7) The ham sandwich wants to pay. He is in a hurry.
Once the phrase ‘the ham sandwich’ is understood thus, as referring to a person,
it seems awkward to suppose that it still is about ham sandwiches. A statement like
the following therefore appears to be too overly underspecied.
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(8) ?The ham sandwich wants to pay for it.
Of course, the pronoun ‘it’ can, as always, be used to point at anything that makes
sense, for instance, at whatever was served to him, or at whatever was done to
him. I do not, however, succeed in taking it to refer to—that is what it would
be—the ham sandwich by means of which the waiter just focused the hearer’s
attention to the person who ordered it.
The replacement in the restaurant might of course be unfamiliar with the deferred
use of ‘ham sandwich’ in (7). After asking (9), it can thus be illuminating if the
waiter replies with (10):
(9) Who wants to pay?
(10) The ham sandwich. The ham sandwich is the person who ordered the ham
sandwich.
It seems pretty unilluminating, on the other hand, if (9) were countered by (11):
(11) The ham sandwich. The ham sandwich is the person who ordered it.
Upon hearing (11) the replacement probably wonders ‘the person who ordered
what?’ He may be able to figure out, upon reflection, that it should be the person who
ordered the ham sandwich. But this ham sandwich [digestible] is not as lively present
as the ham sandwich [person] referred to by means of ‘the ham sandwich’ in (7).
Nunberg later observes that it may not so much be the whole (referential) noun
phrase that gets a ‘deferred meaning’, or whose live meaning is at stake, but, rather,
the (predicative) noun. “(. . . ) there are a number of reasons for concluding that
the transfer here takes place on the common noun meaning–that is, that this is
a case of meaning transfer, rather than reference transfer. (. . . ) the transfer actually
takes place at the level of the common noun, which contributes only a property
of persons (. . . )” (Nunberg 1995, p. 115–6). If the restaurant’s replacement appears to
be familiar with the indicated use, he might also wonder about (7) and reply with (12):
(7) The ham sandwich wants to pay. He is in a hurry.
(12) There are three of them. Which one wants to pay?
It, then, seems perfectly appropriate to answer his question with (13), but a reply
with (14) appears to be pretty odd again.
(13) The one that stumbled in the toilet.
(14) ?The one that fell on the oor in the kitchen.
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Apparently, in the cases above the noun ‘ham sandwich’ is interpreted as a predicate
applying to persons, not digestibles. And it is the rst, not the second, interpretation
that is most likely alive. And the one that is live is present, and the other one is not.
Case 3 (The Philosophers) [The third case is as a matter of fact a whole array of
cases.] Consider the following sentence.
(15) Few philosophers are linguists.
It seems to be common opinion in the semantics literature that quantied structures
of the form DET(A,B)—where DET is a determiner phrase, and A a nominal or
set denoting expression, and B a verbal one— presuppose a domain of A’s and
contribute discourse referents A’s who are B, and possibly A’s who are not B.
There is also quite some consensus that quantied noun phrases generally serve to
quantify over contextually restricted domains of quantication, and, of course, that
nouns like ‘philosophers’ can be used to classify philosophers in various ways:
as professional philosophers, as persons displaying a certain kind of philosophical
behavior, persons otherwise distinguished as philosopher-like, etc.
Independent of any analysis of presupposition, contextually restricted quan-
tication, and discourse reference, one thing seems to be entirely clear. If the
term ‘philosopher’ is used to characterize or distinguish individuals in one of
these ways, relative to some contextually given domain of quantication, then
the presupposition is that there is a domain of philosophers classied precisely that
way in that domain of quantication; also, if a discourse referent is introduced
for the philosophers who are linguists, then this discourse referent involves all
those who classify as philosophers in the way in which the term ‘philosopher’
was understood, or intended in the rst place, and in the contextually given domain
of quantication. (And, likewise, for them being ‘linguists’ in the way in which few
of them were said to be linguists.)
Actually, it seems very hard to explain how this could not be the case. Let me give
it a try. No sense can be made of an, almost inconceivable, use of (15), according to
which few of a contextually salient group of philosophically behaving children
practice linguistics, while it presupposes a domain of professional philosophers, and
sets up a discourse referent for a world-wide group of professional philosophers and
linguists. Like I said, it is very dicult to explain what I think is excluded, which
is that a statement made by (15), its presupposition, and its discourse anaphoric
potential, relate to dierent possible interpretations of the term. Upon any sensible
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understanding of a use of (15) only one interpretation is the live one, although
many other interpretations are possible, yet these are claimed to simply be not
present. Not alternative ones, not even, literal ones—if any.
The very point is perhaps illustrated more concisely by the following two examples.
Everybody, except maybe certain formal semanticists, can make sense of (16).
(16) You have philosophers and philosophers.
Two uses of one and the same term easily invoke—here invite—a dierent live
interpretation. One use of it doesn’t do so, or so it seems. At least I am unable
to state what (16) can be taken to say, by using (17):
(17) ?You have philosophers and them (they themselves).
If a live, ‘secondary’, interpretation of the first use of ‘philosophers’ in (16) were
derivative on a ‘primary’, ‘literary’, meaning of the term, then one should be able to
say what (16) says by using (17). But, like I said, I do not succeed in making this work.
Case 4 (The Presidential Elections) [This case involves a factual state of affairs.]
In 1969, January 20-th, Richard Nixon succeeded Lyndon B. Johnson as the pres-
ident of the United States, so that after eight years of Democratic rule (with John
F. Kennedy and Johnson), an eight year period of Republican rule started (with
Nixon and Gerald Ford).
One could have described this situation, correctly, if one had uttered, in 1969:
(18) For the last eight years the president was a Democrat and the next eight
years he will be a Republican.
Example (18) could have been used, in 1969, to state something true, if the noun
phrase ‘the president’ was rendered, or read, as whoever has been residing in
the Oval Oce over a certain stretch of time. On this reading it would merely
serve to sum up the outcomes of the presidential elections over some sixteen years.
Alternatively, example (18) could have been rendered as being about the actual
president, in 1969, Johnson. On this reading it would state that Johnson had been
Democrat the past eight years, and, surprisingly, and falsely I assume, would have
turned out Republican the next eight years.
Theoretically one might want to try and use (18) to state that we had had 8
years of Democratic rule, and that Johnson now will be Republican the next 8
years, for the president [whoever it was] was democratic the last 8 years, and
the president [the actual one now] will be republican the next 8 years. Formally
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there is no problem in stating such an interpretation. However, it is an extremely
unlikely—many will say impossible–way of construing an understanding of ‘the
president’ in example (18).
It is assumed that the pronoun ‘he’ in the second sentence of example (18) picks
up the president from the rst sentence, and it should intuitively do so under
the interpretation that ‘the president’ had there—i.e., its live meaning. Thus, if
‘the president’ would have been read as Johnson, then so would ‘he’, and if ‘the
president’ would have been read as whoever, in any of these sixteen years, had won
and would win the elections, then so would ‘he’ be read. A ‘mixed’ interpretation
which would enable the interpretation of the phrase ‘the president’ to work out
referential on its use relative to the coming eight years, while it applied in an
attributive way relative to the previous eight years, does not appear to be a viable
live interpretation at all—it has no chance of survival.
Case 5 (The Brothers Karamazov) [The last case involves the writing and read-
ing of The Brothers Karamazov.]
Although Dostoyevsky began his rst notes for The Brothers Karamazov in April
1878, he had written several unnished works years earlier. Dostoyevsky spent
nearly two years writing The Brothers Karamazov, which was published as a serial
in The Russian Messenger and completed in November 1880.
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Brothers_Karamazov)
One may conclude:
(19) Dostoyevsky began The Brothers Karamazov in 1878. He finished it in 1880.
As a matter of fact, I got a copy of The Brothers Karamazov from my grandmother
early in the winter of 1977, and I read it over the Christmas break. It is true to
say that:
(20) I began the book by the end of 1977, and nished it ten days later.
Books are written, published, read, started, and completed. As can be seen from the
examples (19) and (20), the noun phrase ‘The Brothers Karamazov’ can be used to
denote the event of writing the book, which Dostoyevsky started in 1878, and
an event of reading it, which I for instance completed in 1978. Interestingly, it
cannot be used to denote both events at the same time. It appears to be particularly
odd to conclude, from (19) and (20) that.
(21) ?Dostoyevsky began The Brothers Karamazov in 1878. I nished it in 1978.
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What I read is what Dostoyevsky wrote, The Brothers Karamazov. So what he
began in 1878 is what I nished in 1978. Or not? What he began was writing
The Brothers Karamazov, and what I nished was reading it, so not the writing of it.
So what Dostoyevsky began in 1878 is not what I nished in 1978, and upon the
most likely understanding of (19) and (20), it does not allow one to conclude to (21).
We see that once the book is ‘coerced’ into an event, it is the event, and no
longer the book, that is present. Stated thus, this might actually be surprising. Not
so, however, upon our formulation of what goes on. When the live interpretation of
‘The Brothers Karamazov’ is an event, it is not a book, and this is a very trivial
observation, of course.
These ve cases are meant to illustrate, not so much the fact (taken as obvious) that
the interpretation of constituent expressions of compound constructions can be
heavily context dependent, but that these live interpretations contribute to, or
determine, the (live) meanings of the whole of these expressions. As a matter of
fact, once we drop the assumption that meanings are non-contextually givens,
and allow live meanings to enter the interpretative architecture, one can clearly see
the principle of compositionality at work in our actual understanding of natural
language. The ndings of the present section are, thus, in complete agreement with
Lasersohn’s conclusion: “(. . . ) far from being problematic for compositionality,
contextual variation in interpretation is precisely what rescues the claim that inter-
pretation is compositionally assigned from apparent counterexamples” (Lasersohn
2012, p. 188).
In the statement of the LPoC mention was made also of the ‘live mode of composition’
and I want to conclude this section with some tentative reflections on this.
Linguists and philosophers with a proper interest in language alike share an
interest in so-called “structural ambiguities”, apparently or potentially present in
almost every natural language sentence. The phenomenon of a structural ambiguity
can be tuned down, in the present terminology, to the possibility of having one,
rather than another, live mode of composition of a given utterance. We intend and
interpret a string like, e.g., “old men and women”, as if it were constructed by
rst modifying the noun “men” by the adjective “old”, and then conjoining the
result with the noun “women”, or, alternatively, as if it were obtained by modifying
the conjunction of the two nouns by the adjective. The string itself, however,
is appropriately characterized as consisting of three linearly ordered words, and
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does not itself display any structure. It is a matter of theoretical idealisation
(mythication, or metaphor, if one wants), when we speak of the string of three
words having two or more readings, out of which we pick one. Instead, there is only
one, according to the rules currently in charge. Not the string, but its occurrence,
is associated with an analysis, and then the LPoC tends to dictate only one analysis,
reading, interpretation.
Analogous observations, and more subtle distinctions, can be made regarding the
ways in which nouns and noun phrases are combined in possessive constructions
such as “Michelle’s portrait”, “Derek’s omelet”, “Tony’s roots”, “the back of the
car”, “the construction of the city” and “the start of the play”. Given the many
various ways in which nouns can be, thus, taken to be combined, it appears hard,
even unrealistic, to imagine a grammar handing out the theoretical combinatory
possibilities, from which a context should help us pick one. Instead, we assume a fe-
licitous use of such combinations to yield the proper one, which, if not contextually
questioned, decides on the interpretation, or meaning of the whole. If the ensuing
conceptual construction, or the associated truth conditions, conict with other
indicators in the context, then, apparently, we have misconstrued the complex.
Such, however, would not mean that the grammar has failed.
Proper, live, compositions also seem to be required when we employ or face noun-
noun compounds, such as “book shelf”, “bicycle pump”, “kitchen knife”, “university
hospital” and “machine learning”. Here, even more, we face a theoretical wealth of
combinatory possibilities, while on their regular, that is unproblematic, occurrences,
we only use one. There is of course the obvious, decontextualized question, “which
one–or which of the ones?” And, again, the only, theoretically uninformative,
but correct, answer is “the right one”.
The possible modes of composition, and the distinctions that can be made among
them, are theoretically intriguing, but they are mentioned here only to point out
what the live principle of compositionality apparently implies: that we employ
modes of composition according to the rules assumed currently in charge, that is,
‘live’. Again, if one chooses to assume, or live by, one rigid, stipulative, grammar,
the live principle of compositionality only dictates compositions of (live) meanings
according to the rules of grammar, as it is usually taken to dictate. Allowing,
more exibly, for, theoretically unconstrained, but contextually induced modes of
composition, it seems we can naturally accommodate the heterogeneity of natural
language generation and interpretation. I will not go into the implications of this
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notion of live modes of composition any further here, and leave it as a subject
for further exploration and discussion elsewhere.
4 Context and Conceptual Space
I take it that the principle of compositionality can be maintained with regard to any
contextualist ndings, and possibly contrary to some contextualist conclusions.
It may have occurred to the reader that the preceding discussion has been stated in
all kinds of semantic terms, like meanings, interpretations, speaker’s reference,
presupposition, coercion, etc. Obviously, the principle of compositionality, also on
its ‘live’ formulation or understanding, does invoke the concept of (live) meanings
of constituent expressions, and refers to or quanties over them. The discussion,
however, should not be taken to build on a given category of meanings, as re-
pudiated by Quine and ourselves. “I remain free to maintain that the fact that
a given linguistic utterance is meaningful (or signicant, as I prefer to say so as not
to invite hypostasis of meanings as entities) is an ultimate and irreducible matter of
fact; or, I may undertake to analyze it in terms directly of what people do in the
presence of the linguistic utterance in question and other utterances similar to
it” (Quine 1948, p. 30-1). All semantic vocabulary is intended to reect our intuitive
and everyday understanding of ‘signicant’ verbal behavior. All we suppose is that,
relative to the envisaged contexts, the semantically relevant distinctions can be
made, intelligible to us, here, and to the envisaged participants.
It must be submitted that indeed, if one wants to give a formal characterization
of observations of the kind indicated above, which after all constitutes an aim
of the formal semantic enterprise, this implies that such relevant distinctions get
formalized, too. If dierent occurrences of one and the same term are associated
with dierent live meanings, they have to be formally distinguished. Such is
expedient in order to keep the compositional architecture formally transparent,
but it does delegate quite some work to the mapping from concrete utterances
to ‘logical forms’, however understood. E.g., an utterance, sensibly interpreted,
of ‘All philosophers are philosophers’ will presumably have to be mapped to
something like the formally transparent ‘∀x(Px→ P ′x)’. We can, however, leave
the required mappings to the formal linguists, and to those who seek to apply
the formal semantic insights and results. Such is not our main concern here though.
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More relevant to the present discussion is the observation, directly taken from the
contextualists, that live meanings are determined in a context of use. We have to be
careful when using the term ‘determined’ here though. I emphatically want to abstain
from the idea that this involves the existence of meanings, which get subsequently
‘determined’ (‘specified’, . . . ) in a context of use. I think that on any successful or
unproblematic occasion of use, these so-called meanings are there, completely, and as
determinate as required and defined by the context. The idea is that, in principle,
we can all engage in an assessment of the relevant distinctions, in the context, and
of the relevant distinctions imported by a specific utterance in that context. The
only formal, or philosophical, requirement is that these distinctions are public.
Such a context can be conceived of as a public space, publicly accessible, and we
evaluate (interpret, . . . ) utterances as acts in such a space. This may seem like a
vacuous truism, but it does, or should, help in qualifying the semantic abstractions
made from those contexts. At the end of the day, the ‘live meanings’ that we
talk about are eventually not the instantiations of (suitable) abstractions, but the
abstractions are artefacts of a theory modeling interesting, structural, features of
specic acts in the rst place meaningfully performed in a public space. One ought
to just realize that all of the discussion in the preceding section—and probably
all sensible work discussed under the heading of semantics, only makes sense
if the reader interprets or assesses it against the background of any context of
use—most often an imaginary one, but at least an (imagined) publicly accessible
context of use.
It may be noticed that there is nothing that prevents us from thinking of this
public space as a conceptual space. On the contrary: much discussion in linguistics
and semantics is apparently conceptual. After all, there does not seem to be any
ground for anyone to make a fundamental or categorical distinction between
the real and the conceptual, or, better, between things that we know only really,
but not conceptually, and those that are by their nature only conceptual, but not
real. But then it is only a small step to recognize that the public space where we
locate live meanings, can be very much of the kinds proposed in various systems
of conceptual or cognitive semantics. Mental spaces, frames, conceptual space,
discourse representation structures if one wants, can all be taken to present their




That a public space is considered a conceptual space may not come as a surprise to
many. That the kind of conceptual space we are interested in here is public, may also
need no argument, but it may have to be emphasized. Mental spaces, frames, their
constituents, conceptual categories, prototypes, semantic features and relations, are
postulated in a public, theoretical, language, and described as generally accessible
and publicly available objects, sets, or other constructs with a consensual status
in the various theories. They are general coin and a common good.
I propose that frames provide the fundamental representation of knowledge in
human cognition. I assume that frames represent all types of categories, includ-
ing categories for animates, objects, locations, physical events, mental events,
and so forth (Barsalou 1992, p. 21/9). Mental spaces are very partial assemblies
constructed as we think and talk for purposes of local understanding (Fauconnier
2010, p. 351). [T]he notion of a construction (. . . ) is a uniform model for the repre-
sentation of all grammatical knowledge—syntax, morphology, and lexicon (Croft
2010, p. 463). An expression’s content consists in a set of cognitive domains. (. . . )
These are not themselves concepts but irreducible realms of experience within
which conception can emerge (Langacker 2010, p. 98).
Such public conceptions may of course serve as a challenge, but only rarely picked
up, it seems.
Prima facie, this appears to be an enigma for the cognitive approach to semantics:
meanings are things that are common to the language users. (. . . ) The idea is that
the conceptual structures of dierent individuals will become attuned to each
other, otherwise linguistic communication will break down. Thus, for practical
purposes, cognitive linguists often write as if every (adult) speaker of a language
is enodowed with the same conceptual structure (Gärdenfors 2000, p. 155).
It seems that proceeding on that, practical, assumption, and assuming that linguistic
communication factually does not break down, we do well in declaring conceptual
space public. Gärdenfors’ conception of conceptual spaces is presented as an
attempt to make sense, after all, of the cognitive structures as purely individual
cognitive structures. “One advantage, in contrast to cognitive semantics, is that
we need not assume that the interlocutors share identical mental spaces” (Warglien
& Gärdenfors 2013, p. 2189). This paper indeed provides a mathematically sophisti-
cated and scientically motivated explanation of how purely individual conceptual
spaces can be seen at work. Yet, the authors do also acknowledge that “[w]hat
makes communication possible is the capacity to establish similarity-preserving
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mappings between the conceptual spaces of the participants” (Warglien & Gär-
denfors 2013, p. 2181). It seems that this capacity of preserving similarity is still
presented, also here, as a necessary or constitutive condition of communication.
We have by now reached an interesting point in our contemplations. Starting
from supposed contextual and conceptual worries about formal semantics, formal
semantic reection on a notion of meaning has led to a notion of context, which is
a public space, suitably conceived of as a conceptual space—not orthogonal to,
but actually and inherently inviting contextual and conceptual exploration. We
may then, once again, reect on the question what it is that we are doing in (formal)
semantics? Well, what are we doing with signicant verbal behavior? We are
inhabiting logical space, or more adequately in the present context, meaning space.
As indicated above, such a meaning space can be charted along various dimensions.
Charting the realist or representational dimension of meaning, we observe truth-
conditional structure, which has been tracked and still is mapped out extensively in
the work carried out under the heading of truth conditional semantics.
What formal semantics delivers is a systematic account of broadly ‘referential’
aspects of meaning. [Under ‘referential’ we include all those aspects that are
analysed in terms of a determinate relationship between expressions and extra-
linguistic reality (. . . ).] As such that is an essential ingredient of an overall ac-
count, since in certain circumstances, as part of certain practices, these are the
relevant features that our use of language turns around. (. . . ) From this perspec-
tive, then, formal semantics is one methodology that deals with one particular
aspect of the heterogeneous phenomenon of meaning. Its contribution to our un-
derstanding consists of systematic, conceptual reconstructions of certain aspects
of meaning at the idealised level of competence (Stokhof 2013, p. 229).
It has also proven more than worthwhile, of course, to chart the cognitive or
conceptual dimension of meaning, the results and insights from which are also
very impressive indeed. There is this vast body of work on cognitive grammar and
semantics, frames, mental spaces and conceptual spaces. Cf., e.g., (Barsalou 1992,
Croft & Cruse 2004, Fauconnier 2010, Gärdenfors 2000, Lakoff 1987, Langacker 2010).
One can of course also track the social, normative, dimension of meaning, which,
however, has not been mapped out elaborately yet in formal systems. The main
point of all this is that uncovering structure in one dimension of meaning should not
need one to exclude any of the others. Of course, I am inclined to add. The insights
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from the various strands of work can be, and better be, brought together as far
as is feasible. Warglien and Gärdenfors 2013 provides for an eminent bridge.
Traditional formal semanticists may be worried about the present ‘surrenderings’
to the contextualist and conceptualist challenges, but this would be unseemly. The
assignment of meanings to constituent expressions, and to composite wholes, is not
taken to be arbitrary, and the impact of the LPoC itself is built on that assumption.
The live meaning of a compound is determined by means of the live meanings of its
constituents, and such an argument rests on the assumption that one can make
sense of such live meanings of such constituents in the rst place. Moreover, the
simple idea that, in the interpretation of natural language anything might go, but
doesn’t go in practice, can be put to work in an assessment of proposals for things
that don’t go, but, for as far as the LPoC suggests, might have worked out well after
all. An example of this can already be distilled from a case discussed above.
In my discussion of the case of the Karamazovs, I qualied example (21) with
a ‘?’, yet, in passing I denied the claim that what Dostoyevsky began in 1878 is
what I nished in 1978. Indeed example (21) should not be deemed infelicitous,
but probably false, upon the live interpretation suggested by the description of
the case. But this assumes a reading of the example as possibly true, but actually
false. False, if, for instance, we can conceive what Dostoyevsky started and what
I nished as the onset and completion of one big event. Thus, a literary critic,
who thinks very highly of himself, may think of the whole The Brothers Karamazov
as one big hoax that he is now concluding by writing the ultimate, killing, review
of it—after which nobody is supposed to ever want to read it any more. How
unlikely this is, it is not impossible, and if the critic were to state something to that
eect using (21), one could very well argue that he said something false —not
infelicitous— if one nds out that the discussion about the book still continues.
Proper, maybe unlikely, live interpretations of certain constituents may thus render
examples which seem to be infelicitous on a rst encounter to be felicitous after all.
The case just discussed nicely illustrates a more general, methodological, moral.
It is good and customary practice in semantics to investigate certain structural
phenomena, by opposing completely unproblematic samples of language with
slight variants deemed unacceptable, infelicitous, or ‘marked’. It is solid practice to
next propose a semantic explanation of the dierence, for instance, by blaming
the presence or absence of a particular semantic feature or characteristic. The
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concept of live meanings can be called upon to test such explanations. For, a most
obvious test of the proposed explanation would consist in setting up a case in
which the constituents held responsible for the infelicity in the original examples,
are read as having, or lacking, the responsible semantic property. If the proposed
explanation runs well, the infelicity disappears in such a case.
Interference Principle If (the absence of) a semantic property pi of an expression
X is to explain the fact that X does not felicitously gure in conguration
∗φ(X), then in a context in which the live meaning ofX fails (has) pi, it should,
all else being equal, render X felicitous in 6∗φ(X) again.
As a matter of fact, such a test can be and has been applied successfully in specic
semantic discussions. (See Dekker 2014 for some more discussion.) If such an
interference test is performed, a sceptic might be inclined to see it serve as the
disconrmation of a proposed hypothesis, and the whole test could be considered
to ridicule formal semantics. But such a move would be very wrong indeed. As a
matter of fact the test may serve to possibly conrm the hypothesis proposed,
by, instead, providing the proverbial ‘exception that proves the rule.’
Notice that the whole conception of an interference test makes sense only when
one allows for a notion of live meanings. For if expressions are assumed to have
one literal or linguistic meaning only, then infelicity would be systematic, and
ought to be exception free. It may be clear, from the position adopted in this paper,
and from the contextualist ndings, that such a rigid notion of interpretation had
better be given up. Otherwise, as a matter of fact, the principle oers a recipe
to disconrm any semantic hypothesis, rigidly, understood. And that really is
a threat for traditional formal semantics.
5 Conclusion
I hope I have demonstrated in this paper that a modestly realist, not (yet) theoretically
infected, conception of meaning enables one to conceive of meaning as featuring in
a public conceptual space. The various (realist, cognitive, social, . . . ) dimensions
of the space can be conceived to be structurally characterized by diverging, possibly
orthogonal, theoretical disciplines devoted to that exercise—disciplines which are
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